Having heard quite a few good things about the book, I was actually a bit disappointed in the beginning, as not all the information was as accurate as 2+2 books usually are. For instance, calling AK versus 66 a “coin flip” as if we are watching some random TV show (p. 27), referring to hands like T9s and 22 as “robust hands” (pp. 106 & 107), calling KT9 against two limpers an “excellent flop” for your AK (pp. 42&43), referring to an open raiser as limper (p. 71), assuming way too loose play (especially in the beginning of the book), saying a raise to 350 with blinds 50-100 after one limper is a “pot-sized raise” (p.101), almost never taking into account stats on the opponent when making decisions, and a bad analysis of what the opponent might hold (p. 70 “The preflop and flop betting rounds indicate he has a pocket pair above nines, or possibly a set of sixes.” What about hands like 87, T8 or 77 – wouldn’t he call with these hands as well, given your highly suspicious flop bet into the raiser?) are all examples of a carelessness that one will rarely see in a 2+2 book. Also very strange: On more than one occasion, Moshman recommends making a move now with a sub-optimal holding “because the blinds will move up soon”. This seems in direct line with the (by especially Mason Malmuth) highly criticized Arnold Snyder book “The poker Tournament Formula”, yet in direct contrast with the recommendations by Dan Harrington who says it is just the current level that counts.
Most importantly, there are too many (usually minor) errors when it comes to odds or calculations. The author sometimes gets confused because of his own decision to count the blinds as part of the pot and therefore not include it in the stacks. For instance on page 83, where you have raised to t500 and then face a reraise from the 200 big blind who has t2400. The calculation then says it costs t1900 to win t3200, but of course this should be t2100 to win t3200. The same mistake at page 189, where being the t600 small blind you don’t get the “excellent odds” of t1600 to win t4600 that the author mentions – your investment is an additional t2800, not t1600. And finally on pp. 147-150, where the author says that with 4 players left, t200-t400 and a t5000 stack, it is correct to fold QQ against a push from the reckless under the gun player. (Other stacks: UTG t5000, button t1500, small blind t2000.) He shows that the current equity is $323 for your t5000 stack, and calculates that if you call and win your equity has gone up to $444, but if you call and lose it will be $0. (Three players in the money.) So, you should fold, he argues. But what he should have calculated IMO is the equity you will have after the fold – when you have t4600 after the fold, and the UTG has t5400. After all, the stacks after the hand can never be t5000; it is either t4600 (if you fold), t0 (if you call and lose) or t10,200 (if you call & win; note that this is again different from the mere t10,000 that the author mentions. In fact, as there are also antes, the total stack after winning should be even higher than this t10,200). Regardless of whether we count the blinds as part of the stacks or as part of the pot, the equity calculations are based on the wrong figures – and therefore the recommendation to fold QQ is also not necessarily correct anymore.
Good things? Well yes, fortunately there are many. For instance the pages 156&157. Here, you can find a very good analysis of how you should adjust your pushing range in a high-blind situation based on the stack size of your opponent & his tightness. Moshman’s description of when to push the 54 suited and when to fold it, and when to fold or push a K2 offsuit in a similar situation, is a very good one. Also good: The “raising all-in without all of your chips” part. Here, you make a raise that is clearly committed, but that (because it is not an all-in raise) actually represents strength rather than the “desperation move” that it may very well be. And finally the best chapter of the book: Stack-Dependant Strategy on the Bubble” (pp. 203-211). A good explanation of the different strategies that are recommended for all four players that remain in the tourney, based on how many chips they have and on who is (or who may be) involved in the hand.
All in all, after a rather weak first 60 or 70 pages, the book gets better and better near the end, making this a very good work on sit ‘n go play – but far from a masterpiece.
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(7.5)
